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Introduction
This edition of “Configurations of Culture in North America” is the openest, freest, and 
shortest summary of Ruth Benedict’s 1934 classic Patterns of Culture. In it, Benedict rehearses 
the same arguments -- often with the same data -- that we see in Patterns. I hope that it will 
introduce these arguments to readers who do not have the time (or money) to read Patterns, 
which is still under copyright (at least in the United States).
All scholars agree that “Configurations” is an important part of Benedict’s opus, but readers 
will recognize that it is not as carefully crafted as Patterns. The piece has a clear structure, but 
Benedict does not always do a good job leaving signposts for the reader. At points she engages in 
point-last writing, or drifts off into discussions whose role in her argument can be difficult to 
discern. For this reason, it is worth rehearsing her argument here.
Benedict begins the essay with a central question: now that anthropology has the solid 
ethnographic data that Boas insisted on (rather than the anecdote that Victorian anthropology 
relied on), what are we to do with it? Malinowski suggested the importance of studying culture 
in context, but seems merely to assert that all culture traits have a function -- a point, Benedict 
archly notes, that is about as insightful as the claim that eyes see or hands grasp. Instead, 
Benedict draws on Dilthey and Spengler for inspiration, claiming  that cultures have patterns or 
configurations which shape the way culture traits are integrated into them.
Benedict then contrasts the Pueblo of the southwest United States with the cultures of the 
great plains. The Pubelo, she argues, is ‘Apollonian’ in its disdain for emotional excess, while the 
Plains are ‘Dionysian’ in their love of strong emotion. She demonstrates the differences in these 
patterns by examining how the same trait -- bereavement (mourning for the dead) is different in 
these two places.
Benedict then makes her analysis more complicated. She tells us that bereavement is just one 
example of the more general phenomenon called the “danger situation”: moments of extreme 
risk and intensity that inevitably occur in human life such as birth, death, and adolescence. Then 
she introduces another dichotomy that cross-cuts the Apollonian and Dionysian distinction: that 
between realistic and non-realistic cultures, which she also calls the tough-minded and tender-
minded distinction. Benedict uses ‘tough’ and ‘realist’ (and their opposite, ‘tender’ and ‘non-
realistic’) interchangeably, and only explains these terms fully at the end of the section in which 
she discusses them. I have chosen to consistently use the terms ‘tough’ and ‘tender’ for simplicity 
here. According to Benedict, tough-minded cultures look reality squarely in the eye and attempt 
to deal with it, while tender-minded cultures see magic and supernatural powers at work in 
‘danger situations’. 
The result is a two-way contrast that Benedict uses to classify various groups in North 
America:
Tough-minded (realist) Tender-minded (non-realist)
Apollonian Zuñi (Pueblo) -
Dionysian Cheyenne, Shosone (Plains) Pima, Mohave, Northwest Coast
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Benedict then describes how this model can be used to make sense of homicides (people who 
have killed other people) and their treatment in different cultures. Cheyenne (tough-minded 
realists) do not see supernatural forces at work in death. The Pima and Mohave (tender-minded 
Dionysians) do. In a separate section, Benedict examines her two types of danger situations, 
bereavement and homicide, in the Pacific Northwest, amongst “Kwakiutl” (Kwakwaka'wakw) 
and Haida people.
In the end of the paper, Benedict draws a number of conclusions from her discussion. First, 
she points out that more data are needed to take her analysis further. Second, she insists that 
because each culture has its own configuration, we can not generalize from one of them and 
assume that all other ‘primitive societies’ function in a similar manner. Neither can we assume 
that all cultures respond the same way to the same event -- just because everyone dies, that does 
not mean that there is one universal, cross-cultural style of bereavement. In closing, Benedict 
suggests that the study of cultural configurations is similar to the study of individual psychology, 
and also similar to the study of art history. Both these approaches (‘humanistic’ ones in her eyes) 
offer proof of the validity of her approach.
❀
This version of “Configurations” is around 9,000 words, roughly 3,000 words shorter than 
the original. This piece is not as clearly written as some of Benedict’s other work, and I have cut 
some words and phrases for clarity. In a few cases, I have cut paragraphs where digressions took 
away from the main thrust of the paper. I have removed footnotes (readers interested in her 
sources can consult the original text), which I believe are not necessary for an introductory 
reader. I have also divided the text into sections and named them to help make the organization 
of the text clearer. 
Throughout, I have attempted to keep Benedict’s qualifications and clarifications about her 
claims, because I believe these are important for giving a sense of her worldview and project, 
which is often unfairly oversimplified by some authors. I have also kept as much as possible of 
the ethnography -- this text is a classic because it shows us an early anthropologist working with 
ethnographic materials. The ‘how’ of Benedict’s analysis is as important as its ‘what’. Overall, 
my goal has been to create a document that can be taught in a single session alongside SMOPS 7 
“Anthropology and the Humanities”. These two documents together provide, I believe, an 
excellent short overview of Benedict’s thought that readers seeking a quick review or orientation  
to her work will consider valuable. And, of course, most importantly I hope it will spur people to 
a deeper and more thorough reading of this important thinker. 
In sum, then, I hope that this paper, like the others in this series, will help present early 
anthropological theory in a form that is accessible to everyone. There is today a tremendous 
amount of material which is open access, but it is difficult to find, inconvenient to read, and 
many people do not know where to start looking for it. By curating a selection of important open 
access work, I hope to make open access resources better known and to raise awareness of the 
actual history of anthropological theory.
-R
13 January 2014
Honolulu
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Configurations of Culture in North America
By Ruth Benedict
In the past twenty-five years the fact of prime importance in anthropology has been the 
accumulation of a few full-length portraits of primitive peoples. It is hard to think back to a time 
when the chance of reconstructing even a passable picture of any primitive tribe was limited to 
two or three regions, each of them beset with difficulties. The best accounts available were the 
outcome of the lucky chances that brought together a good observer and a striking culture, the 
records of Sahagun, for instance, or Codrington in Melanesia.
The vast amount of material was frankly anecdotal as in travelers’ accounts, or schematically 
dissected and tabulated as in many ethnologists’. Under the circumstances anthropological 
discussion had recourse to the comparative method, which is by definition anecdotal and 
schematic. It sought by collecting great series of observations detached from their context to 
build up “the” primitive mind, or “the” development of religion, or “the” history of marriage. 
There flourished also the strict diffusionists who made a virtue out of the limitations of materials 
at their disposal and operated solely with detached objects, never with their setting or function in 
the culture from which they came.
The growing dissatisfaction with these two dominant theoretical approaches of the anecdotal 
period of ethnology has always been explicit in Boas’ insistence upon exhaustive study of any 
primitive culture, and is today most clearly voiced by Malinowski. He insists that 
anthropological theory must take into account human cultures as organic and functioning wholes. 
He would have us realize that when a museum collection has been installed from the Niam-Niam 
we still know nothing about them unless we know how each object and culture trait is employed 
in their native life. Malinowski, somewhat disappointingly, does not go on to the examination of 
these cultural wholes, but is content with pointing out that each trait functions in the total cultural 
complex, a conclusion which seems increasingly the beginning of inquiry rather than its 
peroration. For it is a position that leads directly to the necessity of investigating in what sort of a 
whole these traits are functioning, and what reference they bear to the total culture. In how far do 
the traits achieve an organic interrelation? Are the Leitmotive in the world by which they may be 
integrated many or few? These questions the functionalists do not ask.
The fact is that these cultures, though they are overwhelmingly made up of disparate 
elements fortuitously assembled from all directions by diffusion, are none the less integrated 
according to very different and individual patterns. The order that is achieved is not merely the 
reflection of the fact that each trait has a function that it performs -- which is much like a great 
discovery in physiology that the normal eye sees and the normally muscled hand grasps. The 
order is due to a principle according to which the assembled cultural material is made over into 
consistent patterns in accordance with certain inner necessities that have developed within the 
group. These syntheses are of various sorts. For some of them we have convenient terminology 
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and for some we have not. But they are in each case the more or less successful attainment of 
integrated behavior.
The proposition that cultures must be studied from this point of view has been put forward by 
the German school headed by Wilhelm Dilthey and popularly represented in English-speaking 
countries by Oswald Spengler in his Untergang des Abendlandes [The Decline of the West]. For 
this philosophical school, history is the succession of culturally organized philosophies of life, 
and philosophy is the study of these great readings of life. For Dilthey the emphasis is only 
secondarily on the configuration of culture. His primary emphasis is upon these great 
interpretations as expressing the variety of existence and is directed against the assumption that 
any one of them can be final. He argues vigorously that essential configurations in philosophy 
are incommensurable and that their fundamental categories cannot be resolved the one into the 
other. His most systematic study, the Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, is frankly 
historically descriptive. When he does become systematic, his groupings are not configurations 
at all but personality types in philosophy; he groups Democritus, Epicurus, Hobbes, and the 
French Encyclopedists as exemplifying his “materialist-positivist” type, over against which he 
sets a type of objective idealist and the idealist of freedom, both of them as eclectically selected 
from different nations and ages. 
Spengler, however, has elaborated the cultural aspect of the philosophy of his school. He has 
avoided their attempt to define and limit “the” types that may occur. For him the “destiny ideas” 
that evolve within a culture and give it individuality are what is dynamic and challenging in 
human life. These have differed profoundly one from another, and they condition their carriers so 
that certain beliefs and certain blindnesses are inevitable to them. Each great culture has taken a 
certain direction not taken by another, it has developed beliefs and institutions until they are the 
expression of this fundamental orientation, and the full working out of this unique and highly 
individualized attitude toward life is what is significant in that cultural epoch. His study makes a 
confused impression owing to its discursiveness and the unresolved complexities of the 
civilizations with which he deals. From an anthropological point of view the fundamental 
criticism of his work is that it involves treating modern stratified civilization as if it had the 
essential homogeneity of a primitive culture. His picture, especially of the modern world-view 
which he calls the Faustian, is only one of the integrated pictures that could validly be drawn for 
modern man. It needs to be balanced by a picture of a Babbitt or a Roosevelt, for instance. Even 
at that, what with his rather mystic consideration of numbers, of architecture, of music, of 
painting, of will, space, and time, the definition of his types becomes confused, and the 
identification of his different Faustian “destiny ideas” in mathematics, finance, philosophy, and 
morals hard to make out.
The fundamental principle of the philosophy of Dilthey and his school has remained in its 
application to the civilization of western Europe stimulating and provocative rather than 
convincing. The difficulty is very clear; historical data of western Europe are too complex and 
cultural stratification too thoroughgoing to yield itself in our present state of historical 
knowledge to the necessary analysis. It is one of the philosophical justifications for the study of 
primitive peoples that ethnological data may make clear fundamental social facts that are 
otherwise not open to demonstration. Of these none seem to me more important than this of 
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fundamental and distinctive configurations in culture that so pattern the emotional and cognitive 
reactions of its carriers that they become incommensurables, each specializing in certain selected 
types of behavior and each ruling out the behavior proper to its opposites.
[APOLLONIAN PUEBLO AND DIONYSIAN PLAINS]
I have recently examined from this point of view two types of cultures represented in the 
Southwest: that of the Pueblo contrasted with those of the various surrounding peoples. I have 
called the ethos of the Pueblo Apollonian in Nietzsche’s sense of the cultural pursuit of sobriety, 
of measure, of the distrust of excess and orgy. On the other hand Nietzsche’s contrasted type, the 
Dionysian, is abundantly illustrated in all the surrounding cultures. It values excess as escape to 
an order of existence beyond that of the five senses, and finds its expression in the creation in 
culture of painful and dangerous experiences, and in the cultivation of emotional and psychic 
excesses, in drunkenness, in dreams, and in trance.
The Southwest gives an opportunity for the study of the extent to which contrasted 
psychological sets of this sort can shape the resulting cultures. The Pueblo are a clearly marked-
off civilization of considerable antiquity, islanded in the midst of highly divergent cultures. But 
this islanding of their culture cannot be set to the physical environment. There are no mountain 
ranges, no impassable deserts that separate them from their neighbors. It is a cultural islanding 
achieved almost in the face of geographical conditions. The eastern Pueblo went regularly to the 
plains for the buffalo hunt, and the center of the Pima country is within a day’s run on foot of 
Hopi and Zuñi. The resistance that has kept out of the Pueblo such traits as that of the guardian 
spirit and the vision, the orgy, the cultural use of intoxicants is a cultural resistance.
The culture of the southwest Pueblo is a thoroughgoing, institutionalized elaboration of the 
theme of sobriety and restraint in behavior. This theme has prevented the development of those 
Dionysian situations which most North American tribes elaborate out of every phase of life. It 
has likewise refused such traits of surrounding cultures as the inspirational vision, along with 
shamanism. It hates disruptive impulses in the individual -- I speak in an animistic shorthand, 
meaning that their cultural bias is opposed to and pares down to a minimum the potential human 
impulses to experiment in indulgences and work off its energy in excesses of the flesh. The 
whole interest of the culture is directed toward providing for every situation sets of rules and 
practices by means of which one gets by without resort to the violence and disruption that their 
culture distrusts. Even fertility practices, associated so universally in other cultures with excess 
and orgy, are non-erotic rites based on analogies and sympathetic magic.
Such configurations of culture, built around certain traits and working toward the obliteration 
of others are of first-rate importance in the understanding of culture. Traits objectively similar 
and genetically allied may be utilized in different configurations without change in detail. The 
relevant facts are the emotional background against which the act takes place. Imagine the 
Pueblo snake dance in the setting of our own society. Among the western Pueblo repulsion is 
hardly felt for the snake. They have no physiological shudder at the touch of its body. It is a 
completely characteristic Apollonian dance expression,whereas with us, with our emotional 
reaction to the snake, the dance is not possible upon this level. Without changing an item of the 
outward behavior of the dance, its emotional significance and its functioning in the culture are 
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reversed. [The] reworking of traits into different configurations of culture can only be adequately 
described when there is a much greater body of field data presented from this angle, and a much 
greater agreement has been arrived at among anthropologists as to the relevant patternings. There 
are however certain configurations of culture that are clear from the existing monographs. In 
order to establish the validity of the argument I am presenting, I shall limit myself to traits 
diffused over this continent and discuss the way in which they have been shaped by the dominant 
drives of certain contrasted cultures.
[APOLLONIAN AND DIONYSIAN APPROACHES TO BEREAVEMENT]
The bereavement situation is characteristically handled in Dionysian and in Apollonian 
cultures according to their bias. Dionysian behavior for the bereaved has found several different 
channels of expression in North America. Among the western Plains it was a violent expression 
of loss and upheaval. Abandon took the form of self-mutilation, especially for women. They 
gashed their heads, their calves, they cut off fingers. Long lines of women marched through 
camp after the death of an important person, their legs bare and bleeding. The blood on their 
heads and legs they let cake and did not remove. When the body was taken out for burial 
everything in the lodge was thrown on the ground for any that were not relatives to possess 
themselves of it. The lodge was pulled down and given to another. Soon everything was gone 
and the widow had nothing left but the blanket about her. At the grave the man’s favorite horses 
were killed and both men and women wailed for the dead. A wife or daughter might remain at 
the grave, wailing and refusing to eat, for twenty-four hours, until her relatives dragged her 
away. 
Such descriptions are characteristic of Plains mourning. They have in common fundamental 
social patternings of violent and uninhibited grief. This has nothing to do, of course, with the 
question of whether this is the emotion called up in all those who participate in the rites; the 
point at issue is only that in this region institutionalized behavior at this crisis is patterned upon 
free emotional indulgence.
In such a typical Apollonian culture as the pueblo of Isleta, Plains mourning is unthinkable.  
Strong feeling is repulsive to it and even at death their whole emphasis is to provide a routine for 
getting by with the least possible upheaval. A priest who is known as the Black Corn Mother 
officiates at death. He is called immediateIy and prepares the corpse, brushing the hair and 
washing and painting the face with identification marks to indicate the social affiliation of the 
dead. Only once during all this ritual tending of the dead are the relatives admitted, and when the 
priest has ready a small smudge from the combings of the dead man’s hair. The bereaved breathe 
this in and will thereby cease to grieve over the dead person. The burial takes place the following 
day, but the family and relatives are ceremonially taboo for four days and remain in retreat in the 
house of the dead man, receiving certain ritual washings from the priest. The formalities that 
more nearly correspond to burial in other regions are performed over the burial of food for the 
deceased on the fourth day. They go outside the village for this, and after it is over, they break 
the pot in which water was carried, and the hairbrush that was used to prepare the body for 
burial, and on their return cut their trail with a deep incision with a flint knife. They listen and 
hear the dead man come, far off, to the place where they buried food for him. The house is filled 
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with people awaiting their return, and the Black Corn Mother preaches to them, telling them this 
is the last time they need be afraid of the dead man’s returning. The relatives go to their houses 
but the housemates observe the ordinary taboos for ceremonial purity for eight days more, after 
which everything is over. The Black Corn Mother goes to the cacique and returns to him the 
power he received from him and must always receive from him for every death, but which he has 
this means of disposing of when he is not compelled to exercise it. It is a characteristic 
Apollonian touch, and very common in the Southwest.
There is here no institutionalized indulgence in grief, no cutting off of fingers nor gashing of 
bodies. Instead of insistence upon prolonged mourning by the most closely bereaved, the 
emphasis is all upon immediate forgetting. The two pictures are of course familiar types of con- 
trasted behavior, and they are here institutionalized for two contrasted cultures.
[TENDER-MINDED APPROACHES TO THE DANGER SITUATION]
In the face of the opposition of these two types of behavior it is at first sight somewhat 
bizarre to group them together over against another type. It is true nevertheless. the Southwest 
and the Plains are alike in not capitalizing ideas of pollution and dread. These two are alike in 
realistically directing their behavior toward the loss situation instead of romantically elaborating 
the danger situation. In Isleta the clan head officiating at death does not have to be purified and 
the curse of contact with the dead lifted from him when the rites are over. Similarly on the Plains 
the giving away of property is a gesture of grief. They do not destroy the tipi and all the man’s 
horses, for they are neither concerned with the contamination of the corpse nor with the malice 
of the ghost toward those who continue to enjoy them. Neither do they capitalize that common 
theme for patterning a danger situation, the fear and hatred of the person who has used 
supernatural power to kill the deceased. These themes however are the very basis of the 
mourning ceremony in surrounding regions. It is no uncommon thing to find that death rites are 
wholly preoccupied with contamination. The Navaho are by no means extreme examples. 
The Franciscan Fathers tell us that in former times slaves were employed to prepare and 
carry the corpse and they were killed at the grave. Now members of the family must expose 
themselves to this defilement. Men and women strip themselves to a breechcloth for the duty and 
leave the hair flowing so that not even a hair string may be exposed. Only those who because of 
their close kinship cannot avoid the duty accompany the body. Four are necessary, one to lead the 
favorite horse which is to be killed on the grave of his master, two to carry the corpse, and one to 
warn any travelers along the way that they may turn aside and save themselves from defilement. 
To protect themselves the mourners keep strict silence. Meantime the hogan in which death 
occurred has been burnt to the ground. All the members of the family fast for four days and 
during this time a guard warns all comers off the trail between the hogan and the grave lest they 
incur danger.
The dreaded vengefulness of the ghost and his malice toward those who have been spared by 
death is not as popular in North America in the elaboration of the horror situation as it is in South 
America. One of the clearest examples on this continent is from the Fox. The Central Algonkin 
have a strong belief in cruel antagonists which the dead must overcome along their route, and the 
custom of burying weapons with the body was in order that they might be armed against them. It 
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was a frequent request of the dying that they might be provided in the grave with a war hatchet to 
protect themselves against Cracker of Skulls; but this the living would not do because the dead 
were feared and it was desirable that they be weaponless. Therefore they are helpless before 
Cracker of Skulls who scoops from each a fingerful of brain.
The Mohave on the other hand made much of the fear and blame of the medicine-man who 
had supernaturally caused the death. A seer was employed to visit the land of the dead after a 
death. If the deceased was not there, it was known that the doctor who attended him was guilty of 
malpractice. “It is the nature of these doctors to kill people in this way just as it is the nature of 
hawks to kill little birds for a living,” according to a Mohave in the 80’s. A rich man remained 
rich in the other world and all those a medicine-man killed were under his chieftainship. He 
desired a large rich band. “I’ve killed only two. When I die I want to rule a bigger band than 
that.” When blame was attached to any medicine-man, anyone might take it upon himself to kill 
him. The medicine-man openly avowed his complicity. He might hand a stick to a man and say, 
“I killed your father.” Or he might come and tell a sick person, “Don’t you know that it is I that 
am killing you? Must I grasp you and despatch you with my hands before you will try to kill 
me?” The point is that this is supernatural killing. There has never been any intimation that it was 
the custom for a medicine-man to use poison or knife. It is a blame- and terror-situation open and 
declared, a situation more familiar in Africa than in North America.
It is well to contrast this Mohave attitude with Pueblo witchcraft theories. In Zuñi the 
bereavement situation is not lost in a situation of sorcery and vengeance; bereavement is handled 
as bereavement. In spite of the great amount of anxiety about witches which is always present 
among the Pueblo, at a death little attention is paid to the possibility of their complicity. Only in 
an epidemic when death becomes a public menace is the witch theory acted upon. And it is a 
community anxiety neurosis, not a Dionysian situation depending like the Mohave on the 
exercise of the shaman’s will to supernatural power, and the ambivalent attitude of the group 
toward this power. I doubt whether anyone in Zuñi has any witch techniques which he actually 
practices. It is never the medicine-man who is also the death bringer and embodies the 
characteristic Dionysian double aspects of power. Death is not dramatized as a duel between a 
shaman and his victim.
[TENDER- AND TOUGH- MINDED CULTURES]
There are other themes upon which danger situations can be and have been built up around 
death in different cultures. The point is that the Dionysian indulgence in emotion at death can be 
institutionalized around realistic grief at the loss of a member of the community, or around 
various constructs such as contamination, guilt, and the vengefulness of the dead. The contrast 
between cultures which indulge in danger constructs of this sort in every situation in life and 
those that do not is as striking as that between the Apollonian-Dionysian types.
Where human contacts, the crises of life, and a wide range of acts are regarded realistically in 
any culture, and especially without the metamorphosis that passes over them in consequence of 
the fear- and contamination- constructs, and this is institutionalized in culture, I shall call them 
realists. Cultures of the opposite type I shall call simply non-realists. It is admittedly poor 
terminology. James’s antithesis of the tough and tender-minded approaches also the distinction I 
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wish to make, but his substitute for these of healthy-mindedness and the sick soul brings in an 
implication I wish to avoid.
Those cultures that institutionalize death as loss, adolescence as an individual’s growing up, 
mating as sex choice, killing as success in a fight, and so on, contrast strongly with those who 
live in an Aladdin’s cave where all the vegetation is something else. It is certainly one of the 
most striking facts of anthropology that primary life situations are so seldom read off culturally 
in this direct and realistic fashion.
Indeed it is the realistic institutions that seem to be the less thoroughly carried through. 
Human culture as a whole throughout its history has been based on certain non-realistic notions, 
of which animism and incest are the ones which will occur to every anthropologist. These 
notions have conditioned the human race from the beginning, and it is impossible to go back to 
their beginnings or discuss the attitudes that gave them birth. We must accept them as we have to 
accept the fact that we have five fingers. Even the realistic Plains have not discarded them, 
though they use them more realistically than other cultures. 
In the region we are discussing, the Dionysian cultures are cross-sectioned by this realist-
nonrealist antithesis, the Plains institutionalizing excess and abandon without elaborating danger-
situations, and the non-Pueblo Southwest, the Shoshoneans, and the Northwest Coast carrying 
these danger-situations to extremes. The realist cultures likewise are Dionysian among the Plains 
and Apollonian among the Pueblo. The two categories operate at a different level and cross-
section each other. It is difficult, however, to imagine an Apollonian culture maintaining itself on 
the basis of fundamental danger-constructs, and certainly this type does not occur in the region 
we are considering.
[HOMICIDES IN CHEYENNE, PIMA, AND ZUÑI] 
The situation of the man who has killed another throws into relief the attitudes we have been 
discussing. The Cheyenne scalp dance is characteristic of Plains configuration. Tremendous 
Dionysian exaltation is achieved, but not by way of horror or contamination ideas connected 
with the corpse; it is an uninhibited triumph, a gloating over the enemy who has been put out of 
the way. There is no intimation of a curse lying upon the scalper which it is the function of the 
dance to remove.
Before setting out upon a warpath everything is solemn and prayerful, even sorrowful, in 
order to gain pity from the supernaturals. On the return with the scalps, however, all is changed. 
The party falls upon the home camp by surprise at daybreak, the favorite hour for Indian attack, 
their faces blackened in triumph
shooting off their guns and waving the poles on which were the scalps that had been taken. The 
people were excited and welcomed them with shouts and yells. All was joy. The women sang 
songs of victory... In the front rank were those who had... counted coups... Some threw their arms 
around the successful warriors. Old men and women sang songs in which the names were 
mentioned. The relatives of those who rode in the first rank... testified to their joy by making gifts 
to friends or to poor people. The whole crowd might go to where some brave man lived or to 
where his father lived, and there dance in his honor. They were likely to prepare to dance all night, 
and perhaps to keep up this dancing for two days and two nights.
7
There was no ceremonial recognition of the priest or of his services on their return. The scalp 
was an emblem of victory and something to rejoice over. If members of the war party had been 
killed the scalps were thrown away and there was no scalp dance. But if the warrior who had 
been killed had counted coup before he died there was no occasion for grief, so great was the 
honor, and the victory celebration over the scalp went forward.
Everyone joined in the scalp dance. In keeping with its social character it was in charge of 
berdaches who were here matchmakers and “good company” and who took the place of the 
female relative who usually has so conspicuous a role. They called out the dances and carried the 
scalps. Old men and women came out as clowns, and as if anything were wanting to emphasize 
the absence among the Cheyenne of dread and danger in relation to the slain enemy, Grinnell 
says that some of these were dressed to represent the very warriors whose scalps were the center 
of the ceremony.
This Plains behavior was unthinkable over a great part of the continent. In the southern belt 
of the United States, from the Natchez to the Mohave -- excluding the Pueblo for the moment -- 
the opposite attitude is at its height. The point of the scalp dance was the great dangerous 
supernatural potency of the scalp and the curse that must be removed from the slayer. It belonged 
to their whole tender-minded awe before dark and uncanny forces.
Years ago in the government warfare against the Apache the inexorable purification 
ceremonies of the Pima almost canceled their usefulness to the United States troops as allies. 
Their loyalty and bravery were undoubted, but upon the killing of an enemy each slayer must 
retire for twenty days of ceremonial purification. He selected a ceremonial father who cared for 
him and performed the rites. This father had himself taken life and been through the purification 
ceremonies. He sequestered the slayer in the bush in a small pit where he remained fasting for 
sixteen days, each four days with a plunge into the river, no matter what the weather, and a slight 
change in the rules of fasting. His wife must observe similar taboo in her own house. On the 
sixteenth day the dance occurs. The slayer sits again in a small pit in the middle of the dance 
circle, a hole that allows him only the most cramped position, and the “braves,” men who have 
qualified as warriors, dance for him. The whole ceremony is one for drawing the teeth of a 
dangerous power and freeing the perpetrator from curse, to the end that the power may be 
rendered beneficent.
There is no culture trait in Zuñi that presents so many unmodified likenesses to institutions 
outside the Pueblo as the scalp dance. From the point of view of Pueblo cultural attitudes it 
presents strikingly atypical elements which are well-known for the central region of North 
America and at home there. One such is the biting of the scalp, reported from Laguna and Zuñi. 
This act is performed in the face of a strong feeling of contamination from the scalp. In Zuñi they  
say that the woman upon whom this act devolves is free of the curse because she rises to the 
point of “acting like an animal.” It is an almost unique recognition in this culture of the state of 
ecstasy, and is an instance of a diffused culture trait, the scalp dance, which has been accepted 
among the Pueblo without the reconstruction that would have been necessary to bring it into line 
with their dominant attitudes.
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The Zuñi scalp dance has been modified at their hands. In the first place, they have rephrased 
the release from the curse so that it is no longer, as with the Pima, a dramatization of ambivalent 
attitudes toward the sacred -- on the one hand, the polluting, on the other, the powerful -- but 
belongs with any retreat undertaken to gain membership in a society. The scalp dance in Zuñi is 
an initiation into the policing society of the bow priesthood. It is taken up into their pattern of 
providing formal fraternal organizations for handling every situation. The bow priesthood is an 
elaborate organization with special responsibilities, functioning for life. The curse of the slayer 
and the release from it are dwarfed by the pattern of initiation into a new set of social functions.
Similarly the cleaning of the scalp, which in more Dionysian cultures is done with the 
tongue, lapping the fresh drops of blood, in Zuñi is an adoption rite, a baptism in clear water 
which is performed by the father’s sisters to give status in the clan group. It must be performed 
not only at adoption but at marriage, and, as we have seen, in the scalp ceremony. The idea 
underlying the act in Zuñi is that of adoption of a new, beneficent influence into tribal status-
surely a clear example of the way in which Pueblo configurations draw the teeth of more violent 
behaviors.
Their attitude is especially clear in the scalp dance prayers:
For indeed the enemy
Even though on rubbish
He lived and grew to maturity
By virtue of the corn priests’ rain prayers (He has become valuable.)
Indeed the enemy
Though in his life
He was a person given to falsehood
He has become one to foretell How the world will be,
How the days will be ...
Even though he was without value, Yet he was a water being,
He was a seed being,
Desiring the enemy’s waters,
Desiring his seeds,
Desiring his wealth,
Eagerly you shall await his days (the scalp dance).
When with your clear water
You have bathed the enemy (the scalp),
When in the corn priests’ water-filled court
He has been set up,
All the corn priest’s children
With the song sequences of the fathers
Will be dancing for him.
And whenever all his days are past,
Then a good day,
A beautiful day,
A day filled with great shouting,
With great laughter,
A good day,
With us, your children,
You will pass
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It is not dread and horror that find expression in such lines as these. Instead the attention is 
realistically turned upon his unremarkable mortal existence, and the contrast is made with his 
present beneficence as a means toward rain and crops.
[PERSONAL AGGRANDIZEMENT ON THE NORTHWEST COAST]
Both the bereavement situation and the murder situation show therefore strong contrasts in 
the three North American cultural configurations we have considered. I shall arbitrarily select 
one other contrasting configuration that is perhaps nowhere in the world more strikingly 
illustrated than in North America. The pursuit of personal aggrandizement on the Northwest 
Coast is carried out in such a way that it approaches an institutionalization of the megalomaniac 
personality type. The censorship which is insisted upon in civilizations like our own is absent in 
such self-glorifications as a Kwakiutl public address, and when censorship functions, as among 
the tribes of the gulf of Georgia, their self-abasements are patently not expressions of humility 
but equivalents of the familiar self-glorification of the Kwakiutl. Any of their songs illustrate the 
usual tenor:
I am the great chief who makes people ashamed.
I am the great chief who makes people ashamed.
Our chief brings shame to the faces.
Our chief brings jealousy to the faces.
Our chief makes people cover their faces by what he is continually doing in this world
Giving again and again oil feasts to all the tribes
........................
I began at the upper end of the tribes. Serves them right! Serves them right!
I came downstream setting fire to the tribes with my fire-bringer.
Serves them right! Serves them right!
My name, just my name, killed them, I, the great Mover of the world. Serves
them right! Serves them right!
The energy of the culture is frankly given to competition in a game of raising one’s personal 
status by the humiliation of one’s fellows. In a lesser degree this pursuit of personal prestige is 
characteristic of the Plains. But the picture is sharply contrasted. The Plains do not 
institutionalize the inferiority complex and its compensations. They do not preoccupy themselves 
with the discovery of insults in every situation. They are anything but paranoid. But it is in terms 
of these particular psychological sets that the pursuit of personal aggrandizement is carried out in 
the culture of the North Pacific coast. Probably the inferiority complex has never been so 
blatantly institutionalized. The greatest range of acts are regarded as insults, not only personal 
derogatory acts, but all untoward events like a cut from an axe or the overturning of a canoe. All 
such events threaten the ego security of the members of this paranoid-like civilization, and 
according to their pattern may be wiped out by the distribution of property. If they cannot be, the 
response is perfectly in character: the bubble of self-esteem is pricked and the man retires to his 
pallet for weeks at a time, or, it maybe, takes his life. This extreme of negative self feeling is far 
removed from the exhibitions of shame due to indecent exposures or breaking of taboo in other 
regions. It is plain sulking, the behavior of a person whose self-esteem is all he has and who has 
been wounded in his pride.
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All the circumstances of life are regarded on the Northwest Coast, not as occasions for 
violent grief or jubilation, but primarily as furthering this insult contest. They are occasions for 
the required fight for prestige. Sex, the life cycle, death, warfare, are all almost equivalent raw 
material for cultural patterning to this end. A girl’s adolescence is an event for which her father 
gathers property for ten years in order to demonstrate his greatness by a great distribution of 
wealth; it is not as a fact in the girl’s sex life that it figures in their culture, but as a rung of her 
father’s ladder toward higher social standing, therefore also of her own. For since in this region 
all property that is distributed must be paid back with usury (else the recipient will entirely lose 
face), to make oneself poor is the prime act in acquiring wealth. Even a quarrel with one’s wife is 
something only a great man may indulge in, for it entails the distribution of all his property, even 
to the rafters of his house. But if the chief has enough wealth for this distribution of property, he 
welcomes the occasion as he does his daughter’s puberty as a rung in the ladder of advancement.
This comes out clearly in the reinterpretation of the bereavement situation in this region. 
Even the cutting of the hair in mourning has become not an act of grief on the part of near 
relatives, but the service of the opposite phratry signifying their tribute to the greatness of the 
deceased, and the fact that the relatives of the dead are able to recompense them. Similarly it also 
is another step upward in the pursuit of prestige and the acquisition of wealth. All the services for 
the dead are carried out in like manner. The emphasis of the society at death fell upon the 
distribution of property by the bereaved phratry to the officiating opposite phratry. Without 
reference to its character as a loss- or danger-situation, it was used just as the occasion of the 
girl’s first menstruation or a domestic quarrel to demonstrate the solvency of the family group 
and to put down rival claimants to like wealth. Among the Haidas the great funeral potlatch, a 
year after the death, where this property was distributed, was organized around the transfer of 
winter-dance society membership to members of the host’s phratry from members of the guests’ 
phratry, in return for the property that was being distributed to them-an activity of course that has 
reference to ideas of ownership and prestige and winter ceremonial among the Haida but not to 
the loss involved in death nor yet to the danger associated with the corpse or the ghost. As the 
Kwakiutl say “they fight with property” -- i.e., to achieve and maintain status based on wealth 
and inherited prerogatives; therefore “they fight,” also, with a funeral.
This reinterpretation of the bereavement situation in terms of the “fight with property” is only 
a part of the Northwest Coast pattern of behavior. It is assimilated as well to the insult 
preoccupation. The death of a relative, not only in a war but by sickness or accident, was an 
affront to be wiped out by the death of a person of another tribe. One was shamed until the score 
had been settled. The bereaved was dangerous in the way any man was who had been grievously 
shamed. When the chief Neqapenkem’s sister and her daughter did not come back from Victoria 
either, people said, because their boat capsized or they drank bad whiskey, he called together the 
warriors. “Now I ask you tribes, who shall wail? Shall I do it or shall another?” The foremost 
responded, “Not you, Chief, let some other of the tribes.” They set up the war pole, and the 
others came forward saying, “We came here to ask you to go to war that someone else may wail 
on account of our deceased sister.” So they started out with full war rites to “pull under” the 
Sanetch for the chief’s dead relatives. They found seven men and two children asleep and killed 
all except one girl whom they took captive.
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Again, the chief Qaselas’ son died, and he and his brother and uncle set out to wipe out the 
stain. They were entertained by Nengemalis at their first stop. After they had eaten, “Now I will 
tell you the news, Chief,” Qaselas said. “My prince died today and you will go with him.” So 
they killed their host and his wife. “Then Qaselas and his crew felt good when they arrived at 
Sebaa in the evening. ...It is not called war, but ‘to die with those that are dead.’”
This is pure head hunting, a paranoid reading of bereavement that stands almost alone in 
North America. Here death is institutionalized in such practices as this as the major instance of 
the countless untoward events of life which confounds a man’s pride and are treated as insults.
Both the preoccupation with prestige and the preoccupation with insults underlie the behavior 
centered around the killing of an enemy. The victory dance has become permanent, graded 
societies institutionalizing the most fiercely guarded prerogatives of these tribes; they constitute 
one of the most elaborate prestige organizations we know anything about. The original trait upon 
which they were built is preserved among the tribes to the south. It was a victory dance with the 
head of the enemy held in the teeth. As Professor Boas has shown, this became, as it was worked 
up into the Northwest Coast configuration, the cannibal dance and the pattern of the secret 
societies. The dancers of the Kwakuitl secret societies are still considered “warriors,” and the 
societies, which are normally in operation only during the winter season, always function on a 
war party no matter what the season. Now these secret societies are the great validations of 
prestige and of wealth through the distribution of property, and the final Northwest Coast form of 
the germinal idea of the victory dance is therefore that of enormously elaborate, rigidly 
prescribed secret societies, membership in which establishes and validates social status.
The dominant drive being the competition for prerogatives, another turn is given to the 
situation of the person who has killed another. One can get prerogatives, according to their idea, 
not only through the death of relatives, but through that of a victim, so that if a person has been 
killed at my hands I may claim his prerogatives. The slayer’s situation is there- fore not one of 
circumventing a dread curse or of celebrating a triumph of personal prowess; it is one of 
distributing large amounts of wealth to validate the privileges he has taken by violence at the 
moment when, incidentally so far as institutional behavior goes, he took also the life of the 
owner. That is, the taking of life is dwarfed behind the immense edifice of behavior proper to the 
Northwest Coast configuration.
As in the bereavement situation, the pattern has led to the institutionalization of head hunting 
with all its rigid rules of procedure. Meled had killed the chief of the local group Gexsem.
If he (Meled)had paid a copper or if he had given his daughter to marry the elder brother of the 
one he had shot, then his local group would have been.disgraced,be- cause he paid in order not to 
be killed in return. Only those pay who are weak minded.
He did not pay, and he was killed in revenge. But the man who killed him on sight wits not a 
member of the local group of the chief whose death he was avenging. That chief’s mother paid 
the avenger a slave but it was a dis- grace to her local group and in spite of Meled’s death it was 
not counted that the stain upon the name of the dead chief’s local group had been wiped out. If 
another man of the local group Gexsem had killed Meled, then there would have been no 
disgrace to their group and all the men would have stopped talking about it.
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Death on the North Pacific Coast, therefore, was primarily an insult situation and an occasion 
for the validation of prerogatives. It is taken up into the characteristic configuration of this region 
and made to serve the drives that were dominant in their culture.
[CONCLUSIONS]
There are of course aspects of culture which are independent of many of the aims and virtues 
a society may make for itself. I do not mean to imply that the fortunes of the sinew-backed bow 
will depend upon whether the culture is Dionysian or Apollonian. But the range of applicability 
of the point I am making is nevertheless greater than is generally supposed. Radin has argued 
very cogently from Winnebago material for the great importance of individuality and individual 
initiative “among primitives.” Now the Plains and the Winnebago are among our great primitive 
examples, according to all observers, of high cultural evaluation of the individual. [But] Radin’s 
point of very great personal initiative is a prime fact among the Winnebago and the western 
Plains, not coextensive with primitive culture. It is an attitude to be studied independently in 
each area.
The same is also true of Malinowski’s picture of the way in which the Trobrianders have 
made reciprocity a basic behavior trait of their culture. He describes the reciprocal obligations of 
sea and land peoples, of chief and subjects, of the two sides of the house, of husband and wife 
and other selected reciprocating relatives, and he deduces from this that what really holds 
“society” [together] is reciprocity. But this organization of society is of a definite type, highly 
uncharacteristic, say, of Siberia, and fundamental in any description of Melanesia. In what way it 
ties up with fundamental attitudes in that region is still to be defined.
Cultural configurations stand to the understanding of group behavior in the relation that 
personality types stand to the understanding of individual behavior. In the psychological field it 
is recognized that the organization of the total personality is crucial in the understanding or even 
in the mere description of individual behavior. If this is true in individual psychology where 
individual differentiation must be limited always by the cultural forms and by the short span of a 
human lifetime, it is even more imperative in social psychology where the limitations of time and 
of conformity are transcended. The degree of integration that may be attained is of course 
incomparably greater than can ever be found in individual psychology. Cultures from this point 
of view are individual psychology thrown large upon the screen, given gigantic proportions and a 
long time span.
This reading of cultural from individual psychology is not open to the objections that always 
have to be pressed against such versions as Frazer’s or Léy-Bruhl’s. The difficulty with the 
reading of husband’s prerogatives from jealousy, and secret societies from the exclusiveness of 
age- and sex-groups, is that it ignores the crucial point, which is not the occurrence of the trait 
but the social choice that elected its institutionalization in that culture. The formula is always 
helpless before the opposite situation. In the reading of cultural configurations as I have 
presented it in this discussion, it is this selective choice of the society which is the crux of the 
process. 
It is probable that there is potentially about the same range of individual temperaments and 
gifts, but from the point of view of the individual each culture has already chosen certain of these 
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traits to make its own and certain to ignore. The central fact is that the history of each trait is 
understandable exactly in terms of its having passed through this needle’s eye of social 
acceptance. This involves another aspect of the problem of cultural configurations, that which 
concerns the adjustment of the individual to his society. The group has already made its cultural 
choice of those human endowments and peculiarities it will put to use. Out of small leanings in 
one direction or another it has bent itself so far toward some point of the compass that no 
manipulation can change its direction. Most of the persons born into the culture will take its bent 
and very likely incline it further. Those are most fortunate whose native dispositions are in 
accord with the culture they happen to be born into -- the Apollonians who are born among the 
Pueblo, the Dionysians who are born among the American Indians outside the Pueblo. In the 
particular situation we have been discussing, the person to whom violent indulgence in grief is 
congenial is well provided for culturally among the Cheyenne; the one who wishes to get the 
painful situation over with with a minimum of expression, in Isleta.
Contrariwise, the misfit is the person whose disposition is not capitalized by his culture. The 
Dionysian who is born among the Pueblo must re-educate himself or go for nothing in the 
culture. The Apollonian, likewise, in California is shut out of social activity in so far as he cannot 
learn to take to himself the institutionalized behavior of the locality. It is clear that there is not 
possible any generalized description of “the” deviant -- he is the representative of that arc of 
human capacities that is not capitalized in his culture. In proportion as his civilization has 
committed itself to a direction alien to him, he will be the sufferer. The intelligent understanding 
of the relation of the individual to his society, therefore, involves understanding the types of 
human motivations and capacities capitalized in society and the congruity or incongruity of these 
with those that are native to the individual under discussion or are the result of early familial 
conditioning. It can be assumed that by far the majority of any population will be thoroughly 
assimilated to the standards of their culture. But the person who is at a loss in his society, the 
unavailable person, is not some one type to be specified on the basis of a universally valid 
abnormal psychology, but represents the type not capitalized in the society to which he was born.
All this has a most important bearing on the formation and functioning of culture traits. We 
are too much in the habit of studying religion or property complexes as if the fundamental fact 
about them were a dependable human response: like awe or the “acquisitive instinct,” from 
which they stemmed. There have been human institutions that do show this direct 
correspondence to simple human emotions -- death practices that express grief, mating customs 
that express sex preference, agricultural practices that begin and end with the provisioning of the 
tribe. But even to list them makes clear how difficult it is to find such examples. As a matter of 
fact, economic life usually sets itself other ends than the satisfaction of the food quest, marriage 
expresses other things than sex preference, and mourning notoriously does not stress grief. The 
more intimately we know the inner workings of different cultures the more we see that the 
almost infinite variability in any cultural trait is not a mere ringing of the changes upon some 
simple underlying human response. Another and greater force has been at work that has used the 
recurring situations of mating, death, and provisioning almost as raw material and elaborated 
them to express its own intent. This force that bends occasions to its purposes and fashions them 
to its own idiom we can call within that society its dominant drive. Some societies have brought 
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all this raw material into conspicuous harmony with this dominant drive, the societies which 
Sapir would allow the appellation of “genuine culture.” Many have not. Sapir holds that an 
honest self-consistency that rules out hypocritical pretensions is the mark of a genuine culture. It 
seems to me that cultures may be built solidly and harmoniously upon fantasies, fear-constructs, 
or inferiority complexes and indulge to the limit in hypocrisy and pretensions. The person who 
has an ineradicable drive to face the facts and avoid hypocrisy may be the outlaw of a culture 
that is nevertheless on its own basis symmetrical and harmonious. Because a configuration is 
well-defined it is not therefore honest.
It is, however, the reality of such configurations that is in question. I do not see that the 
development of these configurations in different societies is more mystic or difficult to 
understand than, for example, the development of an art style. In both if we have the available 
material we can see the gradual integration of elements, and growing dominance of some few 
stylistic drives. In both, if we had the material, we could trace the influence of gifted individuals 
who have bent the culture in the direction of their own capacities. But the configuration of the 
culture nevertheless always transcends the individual elements that have gone to its making. The 
cultural configuration builds itself up over generations, discarding, as no individual may, the 
traits that are uncongenial to it. It takes to itself ritual and artistic and activational modes of 
expression that solidify its attitude and make it explicit. Many cultures have never achieved this 
thoroughgoing harmony. Like our own civilization they may have received too many 
contradictory influences from different outside sources and been unable to reduce them to a 
common denominator. But the fact that certain people have not done so, no more makes it 
unnecessary to study culture from this angle than the fact that some languages shift back and 
forth between different fundamental grammatical devices in forming the plural or in designating 
tense, makes it unnecessary to study grammatical forms.
These dominant drives are as characteristic for individual areas as are house forms or the 
regulations of inheritance. We are too handicapped yet by lack of relevant descriptions of culture 
to know whether these drive distributions are often coextensive with distribution of material 
culture, or whether in some regions there are many such to one culture area defined from more 
objective traits. Descriptions of cultures from this point of view must include much that older 
fieldwork ignored, and without the relevant fieldwork all our propositions are pure romancing.
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